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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHTS OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN EXTENDED UNDER
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
The bastard, like the prostitute, thief and beggar,
belongs to that motly crowd of disreputable social
types which society has generally resented, always
endured. He is a living symbol of social irregularity,
and undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in
short, a problem - a problem as old and unsolved
as human existence itself.1
The illegitimate is indeed a problem. He is a social problem, an economic problem, but above all, he is a legal problem.
Never in the history of this nation, except during the period
of Negro slavery, has any class of persons been so blatantly
denied the equal protection of the laws implicit in the Constitution.
There are two areas of the law in which the rights of illegitimates have been particularly curtailed: (1) under the
laws of descent and distribution of property and (2) under
wrongful death statutes. The reasons for this discrimination
may best be understood through a discussion of the legal
reasoning underlying the law governing the illegitimate's
place in society.
I. COMMON LAw CONCEPTS AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
At common law the illegitimate was nullius filius, "the son
of nobody. ' 2 He could neither inherit from anyone nor could
he transmit by inheritance, except to the heirs of his body.
It was thought that by allowing illegitimates to inherit and
transmit property on an equal basis with legitimates, promiscuity would be encouraged, marriage would be shunned, and
the family would be doomed as a social institution.3 There*Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S.Ct. 1509 (1968).

1. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Aii.

J.

SocImOOY

215 (1939).
2. BLAcK's LAW DIcTIOxARY 1217 (4th ed. 1951).
3. Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 209, 28 So. 853

(1900).
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fore, until he fathered a child in wedlock, an illegitimate had
no kindred and could own no property which he did not
himself acquire. 4 He was, like every other person, subject
to the law, both criminal and civil, and yet no law was
available to him by which he might improve his condition. 5
In short, while subject to the law, the illegitimate was denied
the rights and privileges accorded by the law.
Legislative enactments, their application limited by judicial
construction and the iron hand of the common law, gave to
the illegitimate in most states rather niggardly relief. In
order to remedy the harsh common law rule than an illegitimate could inherit from no one, South Carolina enacted
statutory provisions giving to the illegitimate the right to
inherit from his mother and the mother from her illegitimate
child. 6 Subsequent legislation in South Carolina broadened
and extended the illegitimate's powers of inheritance and
transmission of property. By 1920, illegitimate children of
the same mother could inherit from each other, and all children of the same mother could inherit from each other as
to property inherited from their mother.7 To prevent his
property from escheating to the state should he die intestate,
the legislature provided in 1927 a scheme of intestate succession by which the illegitimate's property is to be distributed among his maternal next of kin if any; if the illegitimate's next of kin on his mother's side dies intestate without
leaving anyone to take, then the property is to be distributed
"to the illegitimate child, or children of the mother through
whom the kinship exists."8 Thus, by 1927, the illegitimate
child could inherit property from and transmit property to
his mother, his illegitimate and legitimate brothers and sisters,
and his maternal next of kin.9 Intestate inheritance from or
4.

[Bly the common law, no collateral right can be derived from
a bastard, being as he is emphatically called, nullius filius, he has
no father or mother, and can therefore have no brother or sister,
but is regarded as a separate creature, unconnected with the
human race by any links, except those which he may form by
his own progeny.

Jones v. Burden, 4 Desaus. Eq. 439, 441 (S.C. 1814).

5. See Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 209, 28 So. 853,

854 (1900).

6. XXV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 156 (No. 95, 1906).
7. XXXI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1039 (No. 576, 1920).
8. XXXV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 242, 243-44 (No. 145, 1927). The Acts
of 1906, 1920, and 1927 were made retroactive in 1928. XXXV S.C. STATS.
AT LARGE 1187 (No. 616, 1928).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-53 (1962) embodies all of the foregoing provisions and is to be read in conjunction with S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-54
(1962).
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through his putative father is still denied in South Carolina 10
and most other states."3
In a few states further hindrances to the illegitimates'
rights to inherit property took the form of statutory limitations on the amount of property that could be given or devised. In South Carolina such statutes are collectively known
as the Bastardy Acts.' 2 By the provisions of these South
Carolina statutes, one who begets an illegitimate child may
not give or devise more than one-fourth of his estate to his
illegitimate child if the donor or testator has a lawful wife
or children living. By judicial interpretation, any gift or
devise of more than one-fourth is not void, but is voidable
at the instance of the lawful wife or children.' 3 In South
Carolina, therefore, an illegitimate child cannot inherit from
his putative father, having lawful wife or issue, except by
will and then only in the amount prescribed by law.
At common law, there was no cause of action for death by
wrongful act.' 4 Since the right to recover for tortious bodily
injuries was a personal one, it was extinguished by the death
of the person injured, and could not, therefore, be inherited.15
Legislatures subsequently enacted provisions basing the right
to recovery on the claimant's familial relationship to the
decedent.
The wrongful death statutes of most American states are
patterned after an English statute, Lord Campbell's Act, 16
which provided that an action shall be for the benefit of the
wife, husband, parent, and child. This statute was strictly
construed by the courts of England to exclude illegitimate
relationships, 1 7 and this interpretation, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, was faithfully adhered to by most of
10. Walker v. Walker, 274 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1960).

11. "[Tlhe illegitimate child generally cannot, except by will, inherit
from his father unless the father has formally recognized or acknowledged
him." Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv.
477, 478 (1967).
12. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 57-310 (1962) (certain gifts to paramour or
bastard child void) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-238 (1962)

(excessive legacies

to bastards or women living in adultery).
13. White v. White, 212 S.C. 440, 48 S.E.2d 189 (1948). When the will
is voided, the testator dies intestate as to three-fourths of his estate.
14. Tollerson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 188 S.C. 67, 198 S.E. 164
(1938).
15. Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 1512 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
16. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
17. E.g., Dickinson v. North Eastern R.R., 133 Rev. R. 769 (Ex. 1863).
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the American courts.1 8 A few states, however, sensing the
harshness of the rule, passed statutes allowing certain persons
to recover for the wrongful death of an illegitimate and the
illegitimate for the wrongful death of certain persons. 19 Such
legislative prescription has been the exception rather than
the rule. 20

II. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ARGU MENT

The problem of legislative classification is an old and
vexatious one in the development of the law. While the courts
have steadfastly insisted that it is within the exclusive province of the legislatures to determine the wisdom and utility of
legislation, 21 they have just as steadfastly insisted that this
legislation be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. The judicial tools with which the courts have
built this constitutional bulwark against legislative impropriety are many and varied, and prominent among *them is
the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause does not proscribe legislative
classifications; however, it does require that the classifications
made and distinctions drawn "have some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made ;-22 "permissible
23
ends" must be achieved by the special burdens imposed.
When classifications are made and distinctions are drawn
which do not achieve permissible ends, no rational basis exists
18. E.g., Cheeks v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 87 So. 2d. 377 (La. App. 1956);
Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952) ; McDonald v.
Southern Ry., 71 S.C. 352, 515 S.E. 138 (1905).
19. The South Carolina statute enacted in 1906 is illustrative of this
legislation and provides:
In the event of the death of an illegitimate child or the mother
of an illegitimate child by the wrongful or negligent act of
another, such illegitimate child or the mother or brother or sister
of such illegitimate child shall have the same rights and remedies
in regard to such wrongful or negligent act as though such illegitimate child had been born in lawful wedlock.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1953 (1962). This section should be read in conjunction with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1952 (1962). It should be noted
that the putative father is given no remedy for the death of his illegitimate
child nor is the child given a remedy for the death of his putative father.
20. "[I]f there is a general rule today, it is probably that the word
'child' or 'children' when used in a statute pertaining to wrongful death
beneficiaries refers to a legitimate child or legitimate children, and thus
only legitimates can recover for the wrongful death of their parents."
S. SPEIsER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 587 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
22. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
23. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
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for such classification and the equal protection clause is violated.
In Levy v. Louisian 2 4 and Glonc v. American Guarantee
& Liability Insurance Co.,25 the Supreme Court applied the
standards of the equal protection clause to Louisiana's interpretation, with reference to illegitimates, of her wrongful
death statute. 26 In Levy an action was brought on behalf of
five illegitimate children to recover damages under the statute for the death of their mother. The children lived with
and were dependent upon the mother, who worked as a domestic servant to support and educate them. The suit was
dismissed in the state trial court and an intermediary appellate court affirmed, holding that "child" within the context
of the statute means legitimate child only.2 Certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.2 8
A similar situation was presented to the Court in Glona.
Under the same Louisiana statute, the mother of an illegitimate child brought an action to recover for the wrongful
death of the child. Recovery was denied in the federal district court2 9 and affirmed by the fifth circuit for much the
same reasons that it was denied the Levy children in the
lower courts. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States in both cases, therefore, was whether the
denial of recovery constituted a violation of the equal protection clause.
The Court in Levy began with the premise that illegitimates
are persons within the meaning of the equal protection clause
and that while the states have great leeway in making classi24. 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968).
25. 88 S. Ct. 1515 (1968).
26. Louisiana's statute is similar to those of most other states and provides:
The right to recover ... shall survive... in favor of: (1) the
surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either
such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father
and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no
spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and
sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child,
or parent surviving.

LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1952).

27. Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1966). The court based its

interpretation of the statute on "morals and general welfare because it
discourages bringing children into the world out of wedlock." Id. at 195.

28. Levy v. State, 250 La. 25, 193 So. 2d 530 (1967).
29. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545 (5th
Cir. 1967).
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fications, they may not draw lines which constitute invidious
discriminations against a particular class. The Court was
impressed by the fact that the rights asserted involved "the
intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own
mother."3 0 In Glona the court rejected the assertion that the
"test of equal protection should be the 'legal' rather than the
biological relationship." 31 The Court found further that the
burden imposed upon illegitimates did not enhance in any
way "morals and general welfare" nor did it discourage
"bringing children into the world out of wedlock." Since no
permissible ends are achieved by the imposed discrimination,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth is not a rational basis upon
which to found a classification, and the denial of a recovery
in both cases violated the equal protection clause.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Stewart, dissented on the ground that basing the
right to recover on the biological relationship rather than the
legal relationship did not make Louisiana's scheme of persons
who may recover more rational.3 2 The dissenting justices felt
that since "[t]he rights at issue [stemmed] from ... a family
relationship,"3 s Louisiana's requirement that an illegitimate
be acknowledged, thereby formalizing the family relationship
before a recovery was allowed, was not unreasonable.
In speculating upon any possible effects of Levy and Glon
upon the law as it is applied to illegitimates in other areas,
it must necessarily be borne in mind that these decisions concern wrongful death actions. The rationale of Levy and
Glona, however, could have a very significant effect upon the
law with reference to illegitimates in South Carolina and
other states.
In South Carolina, for example, the rights of an illegitimate
to inherit from his putative father are either seriously curtailed by the Bastardy Acts34 or, in the case of intestate inheritance, are non-existent. s The Bastardy Acts are thought
30. Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 1511 (1968).
31. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 88 S. Ct. 1515, 1516
(1968).
32. "[Nleither a biological relationship nor legal acknowledgment is
indicative of the love or economic dependence that may exist between two
persons." Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
33. Id.
34. S.C. CODE AN. §§ 19-238, 57-310 (1962).
35. Walker v. Walker, 274 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1960).
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to be justified by the reasoning that if the amount which may
be given or devised to an illegitimate is limited, legitimate
heirs will not be left unprovided for. A testator may, however,
subject to his wife's dower rights, give or devise his entire
estate to a stranger so long as that stranger is not his illegitimate child. Why, therefore, should a testator or donor
be denied the right to give or devise all of his property to one
of his own blood?
The reasons advanced for denying the illegitimate the right
to inherit from his putative father when the father dies intestate are somewhat more substantial. The soundest argument is that because of the uncertainty of paternity, allowing
such an inheritance may give rise to fraudulent claims. While
it is true that there is no definite procedure for determining
with absolute certainty that this man is the father of that
child, surely in cases where paternity is not disputed there is
no reason for denying the illegitimate the right to inherit by
intestate succession.8 6
Practically all states deny both the putative father a recovery for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child and
the child a recovery for the death of his putative father. Although the question has not been decided, presumably the
general rule would hold true in South Carolina. 7 The uncertainty of paternity argument is again the best rebuttal to
an assertion that recovery should be allowed. As in Levy and
Glona, however, a "biological relationship" exists and where
paternity is not in dispute, proof of dependence, love, and
affection should provide a basis for recovery.
The standard argument that to lift the discriminations
against illegitimates will cause a deterioration of "morals and
general welfare" and encourage "bringing children into the
world out of wedlock" were disposed of by the Court's decision in Levy and Glona. It appears, therefore, that the discriminations embodied in the Bastardy Acts and South Carolina case law as applied to illegitimate children-putative father
36. The Court in Gloia disposed of the fraudulent motherhood claim

thusly: "That problem, however, concerns burden of proof. Where the
claimant is plainly the mother, the State denies equal protection of the

laws to withhold relief merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was
born to her out of wedlock." Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins.
Co., 88 S. Ct. 1515, 1516-17 (1968).

37. The South Carolina statute according illegitimates and their mothers

a right of recovery does not mention the putative father. S.C. CoDE ANN.

§ 10-1953 (1962).
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relationships, having no rational basis and achieving no permissible ends, must be arbitrary ones based on archaic principles of law.
A literal application of the requirements of the
equal protection clause would end or sharply curtail
legislated discrimination which is now mistakenly
directed against the illegitimate. In nearly all instances, classification based upon the criterion of
illegitimacy alone either is not related to a proper
legislative purpose or, if a proper purpose is in the
picture, such a classification is grossly over or under
inclusive. 88
III. CONCLUSION
The Court's decisions in Levy and Glona, if confined to
their respective fact situations, may not constitute the basis
for the discussed reforms of the law with reference to illegitimates. The broad implication of these decisions, however, is that legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth is not a valid
basis upon which to found a classification. The Court's rejection of the legal relationship in favor of the biological
relationship further clarifies this broad implication. If a
biological relationship alone is to be the deciding factor, then
there is no doubt but that reforms will be forthcoming. If, on
the other hand, proof of dependence, love, and affection is
necessary, in addition to a biological relationship, the facts
of the individual case will control as to whether recovery for
wrongful death or intestate inheritance will be allowed. In
strict terms of equal protection, a biological relationship
should be the only requirement since it is the only requirement
for intestate inheritance or recovery for wrongful death in
legitimate relationships. The illegitimate has been deprived
far too long of his right to take his place in society beside his
fellow man. It is within the power of the courts and legislatures to heal this blight upon American justice.
ROBERT G. CURRIN, JR.

38. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIc. L. Rsv. 477,
500 (1967).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EMPANELING JURORS
DEATH SENTENCE INVALIDATED WHEN
VENIREMEN EXCLUDED FOR VOICING SCRUPLES
AGAINST IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT*
The assault on the imposition of capital punishment continues. In Witherspoon v. Illinois' the Supreme Court may
have taken the second step 2 up the controversial staircase
that will ultimately lead to the abolition of capital punishment. This statement must be qualified because two interpretations can be derived from a close reading of the Witherspoon opinion. The rationale of the court could indicate the
extent to which it is willing to allow veniremen with conscientious scruples to be empaneled as jurors. Conversely,
this same rationale could portend a complete reconstruction of
the present jury procedure concerning the imposition of the
death penalty.
Petitioner Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to trial, however, 47 veniremen were
challenged for cause under an Illinois statute that provided
for the exclusion of jurors who entertained conscientious
scruples against capital punishment, but only 5 stated that
under no circumstances would they vote to impose the death
penalty." Of the remaining conscientious objectors challenged,
only one was further examined to determine whether her
scruples would invariably compel her to vote against the
death penalty.4 Reversing only the sentence of death, the
Court refuted the assumption that a juror who voices general
but conscientious objections to capital punishment affirms
that he could never vote for the imposition of death, or that
he would not consider doing so in the case before him. 5 The
Court said that unless a veniremen states the he would vote
against the imposition of capital punishment, regardless of
the evidence adduced in the trial, it cannot be assumed that
this is his position. 6 Thus, the Court held that it is pos*Witherspoon v. Illinois, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968).
1. 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968).
2. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968), may be considered
the first step.
3. 88 S. Ct. at 1773.

4. Id.

5. Id. at 1773 n.9.
6. Id. at 1774 n.9.
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sible for one having conscientious objections to capital punishment to be empaneled so long as his answer to the question,
"[w]ould [you] automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might
develop at the trial," is negative."
South Carolina criminal procedure concerning voir dire
examination for conscientious objectors has been similar to
that of Illinois and the majority of states.8 In South Carolina
one who states on voir dire his opposition to capital punishment can be properly rejected or challenged for cause.9 Thus,
the amendment of Illinois procedure in Witherspoon is an
amendment of South Carolina procedure, meaning that conscientious objectors who answer negatively to the new question, assuming they are qualified as to other criteria, must
be empaneled as jurors.
South Carolina, in accord with the majority of states, follows the one-verdict procedure-that is, one unanimous verdict as to innocence or guilt and punishment. Upon determination of guilt, the jury is vested with the discretion to
recommend the prisoner to the mercy of the court, "whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment in the
Penitentiary with hard labor during the whole lifetime of the
prisoner."' 1 What effect these objectors will have under our
one-verdict procedure and our policy of jury discretion as to
the punishment for murder is not now ascertainable. Theoretically, one who voices general objections to capital punishment, even though he states that he will not automatically
vote against its imposition, would not vote for its imposition
7. Id. at 1786.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1962). The statutory provision does not
require an examination of a prospective juror as to his opposition to capital
punishment, but in practice the trial judge generally asks whether or not
the juror does oppose imposition of the death penalty, the matter being
within his discretion. State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 305, 117 S.E.2d 379,
385 (1960).
9. State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379 (1960); State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 147 S.E. 441 (1929); State v. Hyde, 90 S.C. 296, 73 S.E.
180 (1912); State v. McIntosh, 39 S.C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1893); State v.
Janus, 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657 (1891). But see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 560,
574 (1956):
[H]owever,... even the entertainment of conscientious scruples
against capital punishment will not disqualify a juror if he feels,
according to his own testimony, that they are not sufficiently
great to amount to a settled conviction . . ., but would permit
him to find a verdict according to the evidence and under the
law stated in the court's instructions.
10. S.C. CODE; ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
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as often as one without such scruples. If this is the case,
the possibilities under our one-verdict procedure of "hung"
juries are certainly increased, resulting in some cases in the
effective nullification of the death penalty. 1 It is also conceivable that there will be no measurable effect upon our
present one-verdict procedure by the empaneling of these
jurors. They have stated on voir dire that they can impose
the death penalty in the proper case, meaning that their
guidelines in ascertaining the proper case would be the same
as those with no such reservations against capital punishment. Time alone will tell.
The uniqueness of the Witherspoon opinion is not in its
holding, but in its rationale, which gives support to both
possible interpretations mentioned earlier. For example: (1)
Does Witherspoon indicate the extent to which the Court is
willing to go in allowing those persons who evidence conscientious scruples to determine punishment, or will the rationale be extended to the guilt determining stage? (2) Assuming the extension of Witherspoon to the guilt determining
stage, what are the alternatives to present procedure that will
maintain the death penalty as a possible punishment for
capital offenses?
It is most revealing to look at a recent Fourth Circuit
12
decision just prior to Witherspoon, Crawford v. Bounds,
which went one step further than Witherspoon. Having similar facts before the court, it reversed both the conviction
and the sentence. The petitioner contended that a violation
of his constitutional rights occurred by the manner in which
the jury to determine his criminal responsibility had been
selected,
particularly because the prosecutor was allowed successfully to challenge prospective jurors for cause
who expressed sentiments against capital punishment and thus to disqualify a substantial segment
of the panel, without the additional determination
being made that their objections to capital punishment would preclude them from rendering a fair
3
verdict on the issue of guilt.'

11. Cf. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 313 (4th Cir. 1968).
12. 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).

13. Id. at 300-01.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected the established reasoning of
United States v. Puff14 that when a sentencing procedure re-

quires a jury to assess guilt and prescribe punishment in a
single verdict, a juror having bias as to punishment because
of his objections to capital punishment is biased as to guilt. 15
The Crawford court further stated that the petit jury selected
by a double standard' was at the outset more likely to impose capital punishment in the event of conviction than not,
resulting in the denial of due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 7 Conscientious scruples against capital
punishment cannot be allowed to exclude systematically a
substantial part of the venire when it is not established "that
the views of the persons so disqualified will preclude them
from making a fair determination on the issue of guilt, aside
from the issue of punishment .... Such disqualification prevents the jury in its function of determining guilt from being
fairly representative of the community."' s It is readily ascertainable that should this reasoning be adopted by the
Supreme Court, the procedure established in Witherspoon
would be carried one step further, meaning the appropriate
question would be to a venireman: "If you entertain conscientious scruples against capital punishment, are they such
as to preclude you from making a fair determination on the
issue of guilt?" It would then be possible for one answering
the Witherspoon question affirmatively (Would you automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty re14. 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954), 48 A.L.R.2d 540 (1956).

15. 211 F.2d at 180-86.
16. In this case 34 of 75 jurors were immediately excluded when they
answered affirmatively thbt they were opposed to capital punishment.
None of those disqualified had been asked whether their scruples would
have precluded them from determining guilt or innocence. The court contrasted this with the situation presented when a juror who admitted he
had formed an opinion about the case as a result of articles in the newspaper was permitted to serve after the trial judge further questioned him
to find whether or not he could erase the opinion from his mind and decide
the issue solely on the evidence and he indicated that he could. The objections of defense counsel were denied. The court reasoned that "to exert
special effort to qualify one whose mind may be foreclosed on the issue
of guilt while freely excusing those who indicate a predisposition as to
punishment" was a denial of equal treatment in the manner of selection
resulting in the denial of due process. 395 F.2d at 304.
1'7. Id. at 803-04.
18. Id. at 808. The court does not doubt that to permit persons with
conscientious scruples against capital punishment to sit on a jury which
is to determine guilt or innocence and impose punishment in a capital case
may result in some cases in the effective nullification of the death penalty.
But the court emphatically stated that the state has no constitutional right
to the imposition of capital punishment in any case while the defendant
has a constitutional right against systematic exclusion.
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gardless of the evidence?) to qualify as a juror if his scruples
would not preclude him from making a fair determination on
the issue of guilt.19
The Supreme Court in Witherspoon was presented the arguments 20 and authority accepted by the Fourth Circuit in
Crawford plus the Crawford decision, but failed to accept
for now the conclusion that a jury so selected as in Witherspoon was biased as to the issue of guilt. 21 Justice Stewart
specifically stated that the holding in Witherspoon does not
involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for cause
jurors who believe that their convictions would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to guilt. Nor does
it involve the right of the prosecution to exclude from a jury
in a capital case those who say that they could never vote
to impose the death penalty, or that they would refuse even
to consider its imposition. 22 However, the Court made the
following statement that might be suggestive of a future move
in the direction of Crawford:
Even so, a defendant convicted by such a jury in
some future case might still attempt to establish
that the jury was less than neutral with respect
to guilt. If he were to succeed in that effort, the
question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury
capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest
in a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence-given the possibility of accommodating
both interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using
one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment. 28
This language indicates that the Court may accept the
Crawford rationale on the issue of guilt upon further presentation of evidence of bias on the part of jurors who are
19. This may be the proper procedure in South Carolina since Witherspoon, in confining its holding to the sentence procedure, did not overrule
the Crawford holding as to the guilt procedure.
20. Petitioner Witherspoon contended that a jury selected as described
could not fairly determine the issue of guilt and asked for a reversal of
both the verdict and the sentence.
21. 88 S. Ct. at 1775 (1968).
22. Id. at 1772.
23. Id. at 1776 n.18.
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unopposed to capital punishment. Thus, veniremen with scruples against capital punishment strong enough to preclude
their imposing the death sentence, but who could return a
fair and just verdict as to the issue of guilt, would be acceptable jurors. From the Witherspoon decision itself, there
seems a strong possibility that the Crawford reasoning will
be adopted in some future case.
Assuming the extension of Witherspoon to encompass Crawford, there should certainly be problems in obtaining unanimous jury verdicts in capital cases from veniremen who are
strongly opposed to capital punishment but who nevertheless
qualify as jurors under Crawford. Even though the death
sentence may remain a legislative penalty, its imposition in
24
fact will be rare.
If capital punishment remains a legislative penalty for
certain crimes, one of three alternatives to the present methods of determining punishment should be adopted to insure
the possibility of its being imposed. First, the sentencing
function and discretion granted to the jurors in the majority
of states on the issue of punishment in capital offenses could
be taken from such jurors and vested solely in the judge,
the one remaining jury function being to decide the issue
of guilt or innocence. 25 Such a procedure flirts with unconstitutionality since it would seem to repudiate the basis
for having a jury and allows one person to sit in judgment
of another. Second, as suggested by Justice White, dissenting
in Witherspoon, the states could replace the requirement of
unanimous jury verdicts concerning sentencing with majority
decisions. 20 Thus, upon a determination of guilt, a man's life
rests with the vote of the majority. Such a procedure has
merit in civil law, but loses its reasonableness when a man's
life is in jeopardy. Third, and perhaps most worthy of
comment, the states could replace the one-verdict procedure
with the bifurcated trial system.27 Such a system results in
24. Cf. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 312 (4th Cir. 1968).

25. Id. See also Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 50 (1964).
26. 88 S. Ct. at 1787 n.2 (1968). See FLA. STAT. ch. 919 § 919.23(2)
(1957) which provides for the sentence of death upon return of a guilty
verdict unless a majority of the jury recommends mercy.
27. 88 S. Ct. at 1776 (1968) ; see Note. The Two-Tqial System in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 50 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp.
1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (1959); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35
(McKinney 1967); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Prop. Final Draft 1962).
See also MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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a trial of the two issues separately.2 8 The second jury decides

the degree of punishment, and the first jury returns only a
verdict of guilt if the first jury is in disagreement as to

punishment.2 9 The Fourth Circuit believes this system a
practical one for a state in preventing "hung" juries in successive trials because the original jury cannot agree upon the
proper punishment, and in preserving the possibility that the
death penalty will be imposed.80 Under such a system, the

defendant would be assured that only those individuals with
such rigid objections against capital punishment as to prevent
them from rendering a fair and just verdict on the issue of
guilt or innocence would be subject to challenge for cause.

The state would be assured that the jury called for the purpose of determining the defendant's punishment would be

composed only of those persons whose consciences permit
them "to impose the whole gamut of punishments allowed

by statute and that in no event will a guilty verdict unanimously agreed upon be lost by disagreement as to the appropriate punishment." 81 This bifurcated trial system is not
28. See Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against
Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?,
39 TEx. L. REv. 545 (1961).
29. See Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 312 (4th Cir. 1968).
30. Id. at 313. See generally Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 50, 61-73 (1964) as to the evidence that can be
presented in the second trial. In New York when there is a second trial
the state permits evidence
by either party on any matter relevant to sentence including, but
not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background and history, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Any relevant evidence, not legally privileged, shall be received regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.35(3) (McKinney 1967).
New York follows the Model Penal Code but goes well beyond any other
statute providing a second trial for the determination of the penalty. California provides that the range of permissible inquiry at the second stage
should be as broad as possible within the limits of competent evidence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967). Pennsylvania views the range
of inquiry at the second stage very narrowly, only allowing in records of
prior convictions, confessions, and admissions by the defendant. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (1959).
31. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 313 (4th Cir. 1968). See generally Oberer, Does Disqualificationof Jurors for Scruples Against Capital
Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX.L.
REv. 545 (1961); cf. Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 50, 57 (1964).
While this judicial solution or legislative creation of a twojury system will protect the defendant from a possibly conviction
prone jury, there exists the danger that the jury at the first trial
will be acquittal prone. Even if a juror has asserted on voir dire
that his views will not interfere with his determination of guilt,
the possibility remains that his scruples against capital punish-
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the perfect solution since the possibility still exists that the
second jury, empaneled because the first jury was unable to
decide on the proper punishment, will also be unable to impose a unanimous sentence. In such a case, what will be
done with the guilty defendant? Also, if the second jury is
composed only of those who have no objections to capital punishment, would not this also violate the defendant's right to
an impartial jury under the Crawford rationale?
In the beginning, as well as now, broad statements as to
the direction taken by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon
must necessarily be qualified because of the uncertainty surrounding the issue of capital punishment. Regardless of the
outcome, because of its flexibility, the Witherspoon rationale
can and most definitely will be used as the binding authority
that compels the court in either of the two directions.
JAMES W. LOGAN, JR.

ment will unconsciously color his judgment on the issue of guilt.
This possibility-and with it the danger of jury nullification of
the statutory scheme-is increased if the jurors realize that they
will be replaced by death-qualified jurors in the event the defendant is found guilty at the first trial. Since, however, the
only alternative is a possibly conviction-prone jury, it appears
necessary to take the prospective juror at his word when he says
that his scruples against capital punishment will not interfere
with his resolution of guilt. This course seems fairest in light
of our present ignorance of the psychological probabilities of
conviction-and acquittal-proneness.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

-

DEATH PENALTY STATUTES

SOUTH CAROLINA
-

GUILTY PLEAS

SENTENCING BY THE JURY*
Amid considerable uncertainty and speculation by eminent
South Carolina legal authorities that the state's death penalty
statutes were unconstitutional as written,1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court convened a rare August special term to hear
the case of State v. Harper.2 Under the state's capital offense statutes, 3 only a defendant who pleads not guilty and
demands a jury trial risks imposition of a death sentence;
those defendants who plead guilty receive an automatic sentence of life imprisonment. 4 In April 1968 the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson5 condemned a
similar statutory scheme of punishment on the grounds that
it discouraged the assertion of a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial and his fifth amendment right to
plead not guilty. 6 The Court, considering the so-called Lind*State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
1. Page, Legality of S.C. Death Penalty is Questioned, The State, May
4, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1, reports uncertainty on the part of the Attorney
General's office and of several important legislative leaders.
2. 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
3. South Carolina's capital offenses are murder, lynching, killing in a
duel, rape or assault with intent to ravish, and kidnapping, the punishments for which are defined in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-52, -57, -63, -72, -91
(1962), respectively.
4. This situation results from the operation of S.C. CODE: ANN. §
17-553.4 (Supp. 1967) which provides:
In all cases where by law the punishment is affected by the
jury recommending the accused to the mercy of the court, and
a plea of guilty is accepted with the approval of the court, the
accused shall be sentenced in like manner as if the jury in a
trial had recommended him to the mercy of the court.
Section 17-553.4 becomes operative under S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962)
which provides:
Whoever is guilty of murder shall suffer the punishment of
death; provided, however, that in any case in which the prisoner
is found guilty of murder the jury may find a special verdict
recommending him to the mercy of the court, whereupon the
punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment in the Penitentiary
ith hard labor during the whole lifetime of the prisoner.
Those sections relating to burglary, entering a bank or building and loan
association with intent to steal, and safecrackdng, respectively, also provide lesser penalties when mercy is recommended. S.C. CODE ANN. §§
16-331, -336, -331 (1962).
5. 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968).
6. This represents an extension of the protection of a defendant's rights.
Coercion of a guilty plea had previously been held reversible error. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
841
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bergh Kidnapping Law, 7 identified the death penalty provision as the offending portion of the statute and excised it.
Harper, indicted for murder, asserted that the statutory
scheme established by South Carolina Code sections 16-52
and 17-553.4 suffered the same infirmity and demanded the
same remedy.
The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the existing scheme of punishment could not stand; however, it upheld
the death penalty and invalidated instead the provision for an
automatic sentence of life imprisonment upon a plea of guilty.
The court said:
Hereafter,... the choice between life imprisonment
and the death penalty must be left by the trial courts
in this State to the jury in every case, in accord with
Section 16-52, regardless of how the defendant's
guilt has been determined, whether by the verdict of
the jury or by a plea of guilty.8
This means, in effect, that when a defendant pleads guilty
to a capital offense, a special jury will be convened to try
the issue of punishment.
Why was the outcome of Harper different from that of
Jackson? Where does Harper fit in the "death knell of the
death penalty?" What will be the problems of sentencing by
special jury? Whither guilty pleas, whither prosecution-defense bargaining?

I. FROM JACKSON TO HARPER
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act "because it makes 'the risk of death' the price for
asserting the right to jury trial and thereby . . . imposes
an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right .... I'D The Court severed the offending clause and
upheld the remainder of the statute.' 0 It held that the stat7. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) provides:

Whoever knowingly transports in interstate commerce, any person who has been unlawfully... kidnapped and held for ransom
or otherwise shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped

person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the
jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
8. 162 S.E.2d at 715.
9. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1211-13 (1968).

10. The United States District Court in Connecticut had invalidated the
whole statute and quashed the indictment. United States v. Jackson, 262
F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
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ute was mandatory in its punishment provisions, rejecting
contentions that a judge could grant mercy" and that the
statute authorized the special jury procedure.12 Further, it
declined to exercise its supervisory powers to instruct federal
judges to reject all attempts to plead guilty or waive jury
trial.' 3 Employing traditional principles of statutory reviewthat is,
[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative
4
as a law'
-the Court stated "[i]t would be difficult to imagine a more
compelling case for severability."'31 The statute was enacted
in 1932 without provision for a death penalty; amendment
in 1934 changed the statute in no respect other than to allow
a sentence of death to be imposed if a jury so recommended1
The portion of the statute enacted last was struck.
Jackson's initial impact on South Carolina was a thunderbolt. Judge Clarence S. Singletary ruled in a May 3, 1968,
York County murder trial that the South Carolina death
penalty statute was unconstitutional and charged the jury
that life imprisonment was the most severe verdict they
could return.' 7 The court expressly used Jackson as a model,
both to determine and alleviate unconstitutionality, and said
in part:
I see no logical reason to say our Act is unconstitutional and following the Jackson case it seems clear
to me that it is a severable provision which is unconstitutional and the Act otherwise would remain.' 8
11. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1211-13 (1968).

12. Id. at 1213-16. Actually, such special juries had previously been

used on at least three occasions. Id. at 1215 n.18.

13. Id. at 1217.
14. Id. at 1218, quoting from Champlin Refrigeration Co. v. Corporation

Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
15. 88 S.Ct. at 1220.

16. The court discussed the statutory history in id. at 1219.

17. Although it seems improper for a defendant to assert that the fear

of death impinged on his right to a jury trial when he nonetheless pleaded

not guilty and went to trial, the Sixth Circuit has said that such defendants may claim shelter from Jackson. Robinson v. United States, 294 F.2d
823 (6th Cir. 1968). See also notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
18. This quotation is from Judge Singletary's order, copies of which can

be obtained from Janet M. Fischer, Court Reporter, 16th Judicial Circuit,
Rock Hill, S.C.
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Apparently, neither prosecution nor defense counsel offered
any alternatives. The verdict was manslaughter (punishable
by thirty years imprisonment), and there was no appeal.
Ten days later, Judge E. Harry Agnew quashed the murder
indictment against Clara Lou Harper. He did so with the
express understanding that there would be an appeal and
stated as grounds the following considerations: that the
Governor was seriously considering staying three executions,
that the Attorney General had several capital cases in the
next term and reportedly doubted the statutes's constitutionality, that there was a corrective bill pending in the legislature, and that judges and all parties were entitled to know
whether the statutes19 were constitutional, especially the defendant before trial.
Ultimately, no legislation resulted, apparently because of
opposition to capital punishment in the House. 20 However, a
bill as proposed and amended in the Senate would have made
death the penalty for murder, unless the jury or the judge,
upon a plea of guilty, recommended mercy. 21
Why did the South Carolina Supreme Court not invalidate
the death penalty as did the United States Supreme Court in
the Jackson decision? According to the same principles of
severability, 22 section 17-553.4, enacted in 1962, 68 years
after section 16-52,23 was the proper portion of the uncon19. Record at 4-5, State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
20. Page, supra note 1. Minutes, Judiciary Committee, South Carolina
House of Representatives, May 14, 1968, Feb. 28, 1968.
21. S. 948, 97th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1968). The effect of the proposed
bill would be to give the judge sitting alone the power to impose the death
penalty. This proposal conflicts with policies that no one man should have
such power or responsibility. See, e.g., Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (1964).
22. See United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1220 (1968). South
Carolina authority on the point is identical. Townsend v. Richland County,
190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939) (cited by the Harpercourt).
23.
Originally, the only penalty for murder was death (General
[S]tatutes of South Carolina of 1882, Section 109). In 1894,
Act No. 530, the General Assembly added the proviso authorizing
a jury to return a verdict of guilty with recommendation,
thereby reducing the penalty from death to life imprisonment.
From that time until passage of Act 864 in 1962, it was apparently the custom in the courts of the State, when plea of
guilty to murder was offered and accepted, to impanel a jury
and instruct it to return a verdict of guilty with recommendation
of mercy. Authority for such procedure does not appear in statute or case law . ...

It was, evidently, to clarify the law relating to pleas of guilty
to murder, and other crimes in which a recommendation of
mercy by the jury affected the sentence, that the General Assembly passed Act 864 ....
Brief for Appellant, at 4, 5, State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
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stitutional statutory scheme to be invalidated. Section 16-52
standing alone is unobjectionable and fully operative.
Invalidation of section 17-553.4 does not preclude offer
and acceptance of a guilty plea; the South Carolina Court
impliedly recognized this in its decision. The United States
Supreme Court regarded the plea as "necessary for . . .
practical . . . administration of the criminal law. Consequently, it should require an unambiguous expression on the
part of Congress to withhold [the] authority [to accept a
plea of guilty] in specified cases."12 4 To permit the use of

guilty pleas and to bring its decision within Jackson's limitsthat is, to insure that the practice codified by section 17-553.4
did not arise again 2 5-the court called for the special jury
procedure. While special juries could not be squared with
the affirmative commands of the Lindbergh Law, there is no
such obstacle within section 16-52. The court apparently
found general authority for the procedure in section 16-52; but
the legislature may wish to authorize its use by a new statute, and in more detail, or to designate some other procedure.
What alternatives to invalidation of the death penalty or
creation of the special juries were available to the court?
The State in its brief recommended first a declaration that
in capital cases guilty pleas should not be accepted, 2 6 that
upon trial the accused could state his guilt or innocence to
the jury, and that the jury should decide guilt or innocence
and death or life imprisonment.2 7 The State submitted that alternatively, if guilty pleas were allowed prior to trial, such
a plea would be a plea of guilty to murder under section
28
16-52, the only sentence possible by the judge being death,
the offending provision having been excised. Dismissed as
being without case authority was the Senate's proposal of
allowing a judge to grant or withhold mercy.2 9 Mentioned,
24. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1218 (1968), quoting from

United States v. Willis, 75 F. Supp. 628, 630 (D.D.C. 1948).

25. Id.
26. Guilty pleas for capital offenses are not allowed in the following

states: Hawaii, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina (with
the exception of rape), Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of Columbia,

by statute, and in Indiana by court decision. 22 C.J.S. C'iminal Law §
422(1) n.35 (Supp. 1968); Brief for Appellant at 5, 6, State v. Harper,
162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
27. Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C.
1968).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 10-11. The Jackson decision also rejected this idea. United
States v. Jackson, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1213 n.12.
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but not proposed, was the invalidation of both sections 16-52
and 17-553.4 and a return to the pre-1894 sole penalty for
murder, death. 30 The preference of Jackson dissenters Justices White and Black that the courts should carefully examine
guilty pleas "to make sure that they have been neither coerced nor encouraged by the death penalty power in the
jury,"131 would, of course, not meet Jackson's requirements.
Interestingly, the special jury alternative adopted was not
proposed by either party in the briefs or in the hearings.
Rather, consideration of it was initiated by the court.
Not all jurisdictions have met the Jackson-Harperconstitutional challenge uniformly. North Carolina's Supreme Court
denied relief after Jackson to an accused rapist, who after
trial and conviction asserted his claim.3 2 A federal district
court upheld New Jersey's statutes, despite the lower court
Jackson decision,3 3 and three federal courts have upheld the
federal statute.8 4 In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court
invalidated a similar statutory scheme and resentenced a
condemned rapist to life imprisonment 5 before the Jackson
decision. In some states, the problem will not arise since their
legislatures have provided that a jury must determine the
penalty in all capital cases, regardless of how guilt is determined.3 6 In others, courts allow the jury to set the penalty
after a guilty plea.3 7
30. Brief for Appellant at 9, State v. Harper, 162 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1968).
31. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1222 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
32. State v. Peele, 161 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1968). G.S. 14-21 and 15-162.1
set up the same scheme of punishment as did the Lindbergh Law and
South Carolina's statutes, that is, life imprisonment automatically upon
a guilty plea and the possibility of death if a jury convicts. Two justices
concurred in the result, but said the question was not ready for decision,
as Peele went to trial.
33. LaBoy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967).
34. Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1938); McDowell
v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); Robinson v. United
States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
35. Spillers v. State, 436 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1968).
36. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.48.030, 10.01.060, 10.49.018
(1956); WYO. REV. STAT. 1931, 32-201 (1931), cited in State v. Best, 44
Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932) ;U. REv. STAT. 1922, § 9544 (1922), cited
in Wilson v. State, 117 Neb. 692, 222 N.W. 47 (1928); cf. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (Supp.
1965); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 18, § 4701 (1963). In these states the legislatures have created
a two-stage trial when the defendant pleads not guilty and a special penalty trial when he pleads guilty.
37. Triplett v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 714, 114 S.W.2d 1108 (1938);
Campos v. State, 189 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945).
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II. DEATH KNELL OF THE DEATH PENALTY?
Although the Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson
made no ruling on the constitutionality of capital punishment per se, opponents of capital punishment viewed the
decision "as a step in the right direction."38 Until or unless
Congress rewrites the Federal Kidnapping Act, the death
penalty will not threaten defendents indicted under it. Without regard to future revision, although the Jackson decision
itself is silent on the point of retroactive application, presumably, habeas corpus relief will extend to those persons
39
previously condemned under it.
Moreover, similar succor
will sustain defendants and those already incarcerated who
40
were indicted under the other federal statutes so written.
Harper,however, has the unanticipated result that capital
offenders are now more likely to be sentenced to death than
before. An accused, confronted with an overwhelming prosecution case, can no longer plead guilty and be assured of a
life sentence. Moreover, Harper also is silent on the point
of retroactivity, but it limits its call for special juries to
"hereafter."41
Had the court in Harper declared the death statutes unconstitutional as written, the legislature would of course have
had the power to re-enact unobjectionable statutes. Whether
or not it would have, and precisely what it would have done,
are problematical.

III. SENTENCING BY SPECIAL JURY
The United States Supreme Court, after holding that the
special sentencing juries were not authorized by the federal
statute, discussed the suggestion, and concluded that there
were too many problems to warrant judicial creation of such
a system without legislative direction. The Court said:
38. Death Penalty Can Be Imposed on S.C. Murder Plea of Guilty-An
Unexpected Result, 3 CalM. LAw REPORTER 1082 (1968).
39. Robinson v. United States, 394 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1968). In Pope

v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968) the Supreme Court vacated
a bank robber's sentence "in light of the Solicitor General's concession" that "the sentence must be vacated" and upon an independent

examination of the entire record. Relief will also extend to those who
pleaded guilty or waived jury trial, Robinson v. United States, supra, but

perhaps only if the totality of circumstances shows a denial of due process.
McFarland
v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 969 (D. Md. 1968).
40. McFarland
v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 969 (D. M~d. 1968), deals
with the
FederalStates,
Bank 88
Robbery
U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1964), as does
Pope
v. United
S. Ct. Act,
214518(1968).

41. 162 S.E.2d at 715.
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Any attempt to do so would be fraught with the
gravest difficulties: If a special jury were convened to recommend a sentence, how would the
penalty hearing proceed? What would each side be
required to show? What standard of proof would
govern? To what extent would conventional rules
of evidence be abrogated? What privileges would
the accused enjoy? ...
It is one thing to fill in a minor gap in a statuteto extrapolate from its general design details that
were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another thing
to create from whole cloth a complex and completely

novel procedure ....

42

Harper leaves all these questions unanswered.
43
action is needed, and promptly.

Legislative

On the one hand, use of the same rules and procedures as
are used in a trial on guilt, with the same rights, protections,
and privileges for all parties, may seem appropriate for a
trial on punishment. Analogously, in civil trials, in which there
is summary judgment as to liability, the trial as to damages
follows normal rules. So also civil trials are sometimes split,
with liability hearings proceeding first, followed by damage
hearings if liability is found, the same rules controlling. There
is in fact some case precedent for transferring this technique
to the criminal sphere. 44 In any event, a defendant could
always obtain this result by pleading not guilty, "confessing"
in open court, and demanding his established "trial" rights.
On the other hand, most modern commentators contend that
a jury, in order to choose intelligently between alternative
penalties, should consider information of the defendant's background, mental condition, and the like - now available to
judges or agencies sentencing in non-capital cases, parole
boards, and juvenile authorities. 45 Much of this information
42. United States v. Jackson, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1215 (1968).
43. Of course, courts hearing cases this year before the legislature acts
will have to devise procedures on their own and will likely adopt relatively
simple ones.
44. Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P.2d 71 (1934). See also Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1911). See generally United States v.

Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1938).
45. Comment, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 388
(1964),

citing ROYAL

COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPORT, CMD.

No. 8932 at 194-207 (1953); MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959); Knowlton Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital
Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 ?1953); 29 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 883 (1939).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/6

24

1968]

COMMENTS
et al.: Comments

is now excluded from trials as prejudicial to the defense on
the issue of guilt. This information, however, can be crucial
in the determination of proper punishment, especially when
execution is in the offing. For example, information that the
defendant has murdered before, been paroled, and now murdered again is clearly relevant, but is inadmissible, in existent one-stage trials because of its highly prejudicial and inflammatory effect.
Consequently, the states which provide for separate jury
trials on the penalty issue have broadened the scope of inquiry, and, to a limited degree, the manner of producing the
evidence. 46 Several levels of commitment to the goal of obtaining all relevant information 47 have resulted from the
reconciliation of this goal with the goals of expediting judicial
administration and of preventing prejudice to the defendant.
South Carolina should consider the advisability of such
various solutions of
broader inquiry and the problems and the
48
the states preceding her into this area.
Criminal punishment has multiple objectives: deterence,
rehabilitation, retribution. Each defines in part what is relevant to the choice between life imprisonment and the death
sentence. In general, the trial judge must balance the probative value of the evidence offered against undue delay,
confusion, and prejudice. But, more specifically, the judge
and the jury need some legislative outline of the factors to
be considered. The Model Penal Code section on sentencing ju46. Triplett v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 714, 114 S.W.2d 1108 (1938);

Campos v. State, 189 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945).
47. CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1966): "Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings . . . of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime, of the defendant's background and history,
and any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963). "[Tlhe court shall proceed to receive such additional evidence not previously received in the trial as may be relevant

...." Comment, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REV. 386 n.1,
387 n.6 (1964).
48. The remainder of this section is based on the following articles which
discuss the penalty trials in New York, California, and Pennsylvania:
Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers The Model Penal Code, 63 CAL. L. REv. 608
(1963); Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.

50 (1964), Comment, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REv. 386
(1964) ; 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1036 (1962). These states provide for a
separate penalty trial with broadened inquiry whether defendant was convicted by a jury or pleaded guilty. Insofar as such separate proceedings
lead to better informed, more rational sentencing, all states should consider
"two-stage trials."
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ries lists "aggravating" and "mitigating circumstances," 49 towards the proof of which evidence might be received. Such
a list need not be all-inclusive, and the Model Penal Code
certainly requires greater specification in some areas. Additions in other areas are possible.
For example, Model Penal Code section 210.6 (4) (a) refers
only to the defendant's "significant history of prior criminal
activity."5 In Pennsylvania, the scope of inquiry here is
limited to the evidence of past convictions, confessions and
admissions by the defendant.r' In California, however, not
only may the fact of a past conviction be shown, but also
49. MODEL

PENAL CODE

§ 210.6 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) provides in

part: (3) Aggravating Circumstances

a) The murder was committed by a convict under a sen-

tence of imprisonment.
b) The defendant was previously convicted of another
murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
the person.
c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant
also committed another murder.
d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons.
e) The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or
threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
n of)
The murder was committed for the purpose of avoidng or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody.
g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances
a) The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity.
b) The murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
d) The murder was committed under circumstances which
the defendant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal
act was relatively minor.
f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
50. MODE, PENAL CODE § 210.6 (4) (a) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
51. Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 50,
59 (1964); 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1962).
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either side may show the circumstances surrounding the
crime, and the jury is free to re-evaluate the evidence independently. 52 Moreover, in two instances California also permits evidence of crimes for which the defendant has not
been convicted. First, if there was no trial at all, the prosecution can attempt to prove the crime by independent means,
beyond a reasonable doubt, but it cannot rely on a mere
arrest or the mere filing of charges.5 3 Second, even when
the defendant was tried and acquitted, apparently the prosecution may attempt to prove the crime and the jury
should
54
consider it, if proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Model Penal Code does not authorize admission of evidence on the ramifications of a life sentence-that is, the
possibilities of parole and the average number of years
served. California once did, but the courts recently overturned
this practice as an encroachment on the power of the parole
board. 55
Apparently, no jurisdictions allow admission of statistical
evidence or argument on the deterrent effect of capital punishment, on the grounds that this is properly the province
of the legislature. No individual's case should be sacrificed
to broad social policy without regard to his crime.5 6
Of course, inflammatory evidence in any category should
be excluded.
In addition to broadening the scope of inquiry at the penalty
trial, New York has boldly discarded all the exclusionary rules
of evidence. 5 T Hearsay evidence is thus admissible. At least
two alternative positions appear. While there may be justification for relaxing even the hearsay rule, traditional jurisprudence demands more protection for the defendant. Hear52. People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959); Comment, The
CaliforniaPenalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REV. 386, 394-95 (1964). The defendant may not impeach a conviction on the basis of the legality of the conviction or the process of its adjudication. People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137,
390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964).

53. People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1964), and cases cited therein; Comment, The California Penalty Trial,
52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 397 (1964).
54. People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432, 32 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1963); Comment,
The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 397-98 (1964).
55. Comment, The CaliforniaPenalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 392-93
(1964).
56. Id. at 390-91.
57. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a(3)

(McKinney 1967) provides: "Any

relevant evidence, not legally privileged, shall be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence."
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say specifically offends the sixth amendment right to confrontation, and may well-even in the terms of our broader
inquiry here-violate the "fundamental fairness" test of due
process. 58 Thus, California upholds the well-established rule
and limits its courts to "competent" evidence.5 9 However,
most jurisdictions have always allowed deviations from the
general rule "where adequate safeguards are provided." 60
The Model Penal Code compromise position admits hearsay
"when the defendant's counsel is afforded a fair opportunity
to rebut any hearsay statements."'61
To some observers, jury sentences have often appeared
arbitrary. Others feel that a jury's discretion provides the
flexibility that makes our judicial system work most successfully. To ward off arbitrary jury action, the Model Penal
Code has advanced its "categorical prerequisite" approach to
the problem of jury discretion. 62 A list of "aggravating" and
"mitigating circumstances"0' 3 may be set out. The jury is
required to find an "aggravating circumstance" before imposing death; even then the finding of a "mitigating circumstance" may reduce the sentence. The lists need not be all-inclusive, and no relative weights are assigned. Under this
approach, the jury does retain some discretion, but the legislature is able to express society's view on the different circumstances under which death or life imprisonment should
be imposed. In contrast, New York and California have declined to provide any formula for sentencing, on the theory
that the relevant considerations are too complex. 64 Factors
to be considered in the jury's "legal discretion" are listed,
but the jury's discretion is absolute.
In close correlation is the problem of the standard of proof
to be required. Generally, the prosecution has the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The death penalty should
not be imposed with less than certainty. But most commen58. See generally Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 50 (1964); id at 63-67 (on the heresay rule).
59. Id. at 59.
60. Id. at 64, citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE 210.6 (2), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1962).

62. Id. § 210.6(1); Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 50, 74-75 (1964). 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 149 (1959) advocated
adoption of this position in California.
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (4) (b) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
64. Note, The Two-Tral System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 50,
74 (1964); 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 149 (1959).
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tators feel that it is not possible to prove absolutely that a
man should or should not die. 65 As an alternative instruction
to the jury, one authority suggests that "the proper test is,
simply, in their judgment, whether the defendant should be
killed or whether he should be sentenced to such imprisonment as the Code provides." 6 6 In California, there is no
burden of persuasion on either side, nor of producing any
67
evidence at all.
Courts historically have had the power to review jury
verdicts, and, in their discretion, to call for new trials, or
in lieu thereof, to reduce the penalties imposed. The California and New York Penal Codes both provide that verdicts
imposing the death penalty are subject to review by the supreme court, and authorize reversal of the verdict if there
is prejudicial error and automatic reduction of the sentence to
life imprisonment. 68 This procedure may place judicial restraint on absolute, potentially arbitrary jury discretion, in
lieu of or in addition to legislative guidance through "categorical prerequisites."
IV. WHITHER GUILTY PLEAS, WHITHER PROSECUTION-DEFENSE
BARGAINING?
Undoubtedly, Harper will compound the congestion of our
court dockets. But to what degree?69 Guilty pleas are still
permissible. Certainly jury trials as to penalty will take considerably longer than sentencing by the judge, for a jury must
be impanelled with all the delay inherit therein. Then presentation of evidence by each side may well be as long and detailed
as in a normal trial-or possibly even more so if the inquiry
is broadened to include, for example, evidence of past crimes.
If there is an equal risk of death in pleading guilty and
not guilty-and this is what Jackson demands--presumably
fewer defendants will plead guilty. Although some may al65. Kuh,A ProsecutorConsiders the Model Penal Code, 63 CAL. L. REV.
608, 615 (1963) ; Comment, The CaliforniaPenalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REV.
386, 401-02 (1964).

66. Kuh, supra note 65, at 615.
67. Comment, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 402

(1964).
68. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1181(7), 1239(b) (West 1956); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.35 (McKinney 1967); Comment, The California Penalty Trial,
52 CAL. L. REv. 386, 404-05 (1964).
69. Statistics in the Annual Report of the Attorney General to the General Assembly, July 1966 to July 1967, at 304, show a total of 216 capital

offenses in the State in that one year period.
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ways plead guilty and hope to win jury sympathy by "owning
up" to their crime, nonetheless, our dockets will carry full
trials in more capital cases.
However, if through prosecution-defense bargaining, the
accused does plead guilty, the prosecution in return may "ease
up" and not present all its evidence in aggravation. This may
shorten trials in the short run. But consistently lighter sentences for guilty pleaders may result. If so, the new procedure may be declared unconstitutional. A statute unobjectionable on its face but under which an objectionable
practice develops will be invalidated as though it were patently unconstitutional. Moreover, since it is well known that
the guilty-plea-leads-to-life-imprisonment practice existed before and under section 17-553.4, it will be easier for a future
defendant to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the Harper procedure.
However, in all likelihood merely the terms of such prosecution-defense bargaining will change. Henceforth, the defendant may just plead guilty to manslaughter with a 30
year sentence, instead of to murder with an automatic life
sentence, as he did before Jackson and Harper. If so, the
putative thrust of Jackson and Harper will be effectively
parried.
CLINCH HEYWARD BELSER, JR.
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